DEMOCRACY & NATURE: The International Journal of INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2000)
Beyond Marx and Proudhon
Abstract: A close examination of the Marx versus Proudhon debate shows the need to assimilate the bitter experiences of the socialist (statist and libertarian) movement in the last 150 years or so, in order to develop a new kind of problematique suitable for todays reality of the internationalised market economy. A problematique, which will be the basis for a new project aiming to provide not just another utopia (justified by pseudo-scientific or objective laws of social evolution) but also a way out of the chronic multidimensional crisis to which the dynamic of the market economy and representative democracy has led us.
It is well known that the contrast between Marx and Proudhon, which started with an exchange of letters between them and culminated in the exchange of the two Mis่res, marked the beginning of the split between statist and libertarian socialisma split which reached its climax in the dispute between Marx and Bakunin within the First International. Today, almost a century and a half since this debate, the socialist project is in ruins after the collapse of both expressions of statist socialism (the version of socialism which dominated the socialist movement since then) i.e. the actually existing socialism of the East and social democracy of the West. Furthermore, despite the fact that libertarian socialism is still untried, (after the most serious attempt to implement its principles during the Spanish civil war was stifled by the fascist hordes, which were acting under the tolerant eye of Western democracies), the collapse of the statist version of socialism has not led to a revival of its libertarian version. Instead, the institutional framework defined by the market economy and liberal democracy have become universal; consequently, the chronic multidimensional crisis (political, economic, ecological, social and cultural) which arose with the emergence of this institutional framework, about two hundred years ago, has also been universalised and exacerbated. This is obvious by the huge and presently exploding concentration of political and economic power at fewer and fewer hands.
To my mind, the present failure of libertarian socialism is not accidental. It has to do with the fact that few libertarians today (notably, Murray Bookchin) attempted to renew libertarian theory in general and none (with the exception of Democracy & Nature) attempted to make it compatible with the reality of todays internationalised market economy. Instead, they have either been stuck to the old debates with statist socialists (continental Europe), or have turned to various forms of Far Eastern irrationalism ―Taoism, Zen etc― (Anglo-Saxon countries), betraying the struggles of their predecessors in the libertarian movement who have fought bitter struggles against Judeo-Christianism, i.e. the European version of irrationalism.
Today, a re-examination of the Marx-Proudhon debate, as expressed in particular in the two Mis่res, may be particularly useful in the light of the collapse of the socialist movement. A close examination of this debate will show that a revival of libertarian theory has to transcend both statist and libertarian socialism, in a new synthesis of the two major historical traditions ―the socialist and the democratic one― with the radical currents within the new social movements (the green, the feminist, the autonomy and other movements). I will attempt below to examine this debate in connection with their respective views on three major areas of difference or similarity:
2. market economy and competition
1. Beyond the Marxist and Proudhonian sciences
Both Marx and Proudhon had no doubts about the scientific character of their own theories. This was not of course unexpected if one takes into account that, at the time they developed their own liberatory projects, scientism, i.e. the excessive belief in everything scientific, was at its highest point. In such a climate, respectability about the seriousness of their views on an alternative society could only be gained by draping them in scientific colours. Of course, this does not mean that the two protagonists did not genuinely believe that they have discovered the laws governing the economy and society.
Thus, Marx, on the basis of changes in the economic sphere (i.e., the sphere that was mainly responsible for the transformation of society at a specific place and time ―Europe in the transition to capitalism), attempted to provide a universal interpretation of all human history and render the socialist transformation of society historically necessary. Marx had no doubts about the scientific character of his economic laws, which he viewed as iron laws yielding inevitable results, or about the objective character of his conception, which he paralleled to a natural history process:
It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results (...) My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history (...)
The objective character of Marxist theory was taken for granted by Marx and his followers as the following extract from Lenins work makes obvious:
[M]aterialism provided an absolutely objective criterion [my emphasis] by singling out the relations of production as the structure of society (...) creating the possibility of a strictly scientific approach to historical and social problems.
Similarly, Proudhon, writing earlier than Marx, had no doubts at all about the scientific and objective character of his theories. In fact, the beginning sentence of the first chapter in his Philosophy of Misery is an affirmation of his belief in economic science:
I AFFIRM the REALITY of an economic science. This proposition, which few economists now dare to question ( ) I affirm, on the other hand, the absolute certainty as well as the progressive nature of economic science, of all the sciences in my opinion the most comprehensive, the purest, the best supported by facts.
Proudhon goes on to assert that he does not regard as a science the political economy of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, and J. B. Say (i.e. what we would call today orthodox economics) which he sees as an incoherent ensemble of theories and aptly characterises as the organization of robbery and poverty. He then proceeds to dismiss what counted at the time as socialist economics by declaring that both orthodox and socialist economics are guilty of disloyalty to science and of mutual calumny, when on the one hand political economy, mistaking for science its scraps of theory, denies the possibility of further progress; and when socialism, abandoning tradition, aims at re-establishing society on undiscoverable bases. So, after acknowledging that both orthodox and socialist economics appeal to a common authority, whose support each claims, ― SCIENCE, Proudhon declares the superiority of his own science as follows:
In such a situation what is the mandate of science? Certainly not to halt in an arbitrary, inconceivable, and impossible juste milieu; it is to generalize further, and discover a third principle, a fact, a superior law, which shall explain the fiction of capital and the myth of property, and reconcile them with the theory which makes labour the origin of all wealth. This is what socialism, if it wishes to proceed logically, must undertake ( ) it is enough to say that there is a superior formula which reconciles the socialistic utopias and the mutilated theories of political economy, and that the problem is to discover it. 
In the same vein, Marx saw as his first task to dismiss Proudhons science. In fact, the main focus of his critique against him is the non-scientific character of Proudhons theory. Thus, as he points out in a letter to J. B. Schweitzer:
There, (Misery of Philosophy) I showed how little (Proudhon) has penetrated into the secret of scientific dialectics ( ) and how he and the utopians are hunting for a so-called science by which a formula for the solution of the social question is to be excogitated a priori, instead of deriving their science from a critical knowledge of the historical movement, a movement which itself produces the material conditions of emancipation (...) Science for him reduces itself to the slender proportions of a scientific formula; he is the man in search of formulas.
All this, after he had accused Proudhon that he does not understand that the categories used by political economists are as little eternal as the relations they express; they are historical and transitory products ―forgetting in the process that exactly the same could be said about his own categories which he attempted to apply in explaining the entire human history! Then, having dismissed Proudhons science, Marx went on to devote the entire fourth volume of Capital to disprove orthodox economics. Not surprisingly, recently, structural-Marxists declared that Marxism is not only a science but a superior science, in fact, the science of all sciences, given its ability to synthesise the various special sciences: Marxism therefore becomes the general theory of Theoretical Practice and the key to and judge of what counts as genuine knowledge.
It is therefore obvious that both Proudhon and Marx, following the modernist tradition, attempted to rely on objective theories and methods, (i.e., on procedures that are supposedly valid, irrespective of our expectations, wishes, attitudes and ideas) in order to justify the need for an alternative society. The implicit argument in favour of such an approach is that such theories and methods reflect in fact objective processes at work in society or the natural world. However, as I tried to show elsewhere, the choice of a scientific or objectivist method to justify the need for an alternative society is both problematic and undesirable.
It is problematic because few believe today, after the decisive introduction in twentieth-century science of the uncertainty principle and chaos theory, that it is still possible to derive any objectivy laws or tendencies of social change. If cause and effect can be uncertain even in physics, the most exact of sciences, and the reference to necessary and universal laws is disputed even with respect to the natural world, it is obvious that postulating objective laws or tendencies which are applicable to society is, at least, absurd.
It is undesirable because, as the case of the statist socialism has shown, there is a definite link between the scientification of that project in the hands of Marxists-Leninists and the consequent bureaucratisation of socialist politics and the totalitarian transformation of social organisation. In other words, It was exactly the Marxist conversion of the socialist project into an objective science that contributed significantly to the establishment of new hierarchical structures, initially, in the socialist movement and, later, in society at large. The basis of the new hierarchical structures was the social division created between, on the one hand, the avantgarde, that was alone in an objective position to lead the movement (because of its knowledge of the scientific truth that Marxism embodied) and, on the other, the masses. Thus, it is a well-known historical fact that in both the pre-revolutionary Marxist movements, as well as in the post-revolutionary governments, the justification of the concentration of power in the hands of the party elite was based on the fact that they alone knew how to interpret history and take appropriate action in order to accelerate the historical process towards socialism. As Marcuse pointed out, a straight road seems to lead from Lenin's `consciousness from without' and his notion of the centralised authoritarian party to Stalinism. This is so, not only because, according to Lenin, workers are not able, on their own, to develop a scientific theory of socialism, a task which historically has been left to the intellectuals, but also because the custodians of the scientific orthodoxy, the party, or rather the party leadership, appears as the historical repository of the "true" interests of the proletariat and above the proletariat.
Therefore, the fact that Proudhon in his correspondence with Marx seemed to reject the conversion of the socialist project into a new religion (let us not set ourselves up as the apostles of a new religion, even if it be the religion of logic, or of reason) is no indication that had Proudhonian anarchism dominated the movement, instead of Marxist socialism, the creation of new hierarchical structures would have been avoided. It is not the intentions of Marx or Proudhon et al, as such, that might lead to such a development but the scientification or objectification of the liberatory project, (from Marx to Proudhon and from Kropotkin to Bookchin) which inevitably leads to the creation of a new hierarchical division within the liberatory movement between the holders of the scientific or objective truth and the rest.
However, if modernist objectivism seems problematical and undesirable, this does not mean that post-modernist subjectivism is less problematical and more desirable. Post-modernism may easily lead to general relativism and irrationalism, if not to complete abandonment of radical politics. Thus, adopting the post-modern generalised conformism, in effect, implies the abandonment of any idea of a liberatory project under the (miserable) pretext of letting polyphony flourish and under the (right) banner that politics, rightly understood, is firmly subjective. In fact, the dilemma of having to choose between either a modernist objectivist approach or a post-modernist subjectivist approach, in justifying the project for an alternative society, is a false one. Today, it is possible to define a liberatory project for an inclusive democracy without recourse to controversial objective grounds, or to post-modern neoconservatism. Thus, when we define the liberatory project in terms of the demand for social and individual autonomy, as I did elsewhere, we do so because we responsibly choose autonomy, as well as its expression in democracy, and we explicitly rule out the possibility of establishing any objective laws, processes or tendencies which, inevitably, or rationally, lead to the fulfilment of the autonomy project.
Furthermore, by defining freedom in terms of autonomy it is possible to see democracy not just as a structure institutionalising the equal sharing of power, but, also, as a process of social self-institution, in the context of which politics constitutes an expression of both collective and individual autonomy. Thus, as an expression of collective autonomy, politics takes the form of calling into question the existing institutions and of changing them through deliberate collective action. Also, as an expression of individual autonomy, the polis secures more than human survival. Politics makes possible mans development as a creature capable of genuine autonomy, freedom and excellence. This is important if we take particularly into account the fact that a common error in libertarian discussions on democracy is to characterise various types of past societies, or communities, as democracies, just because they involved democratic forms of decision taking (popular assemblies) or economic equality. Democracy, as a process of social self-institution, implies a society which is open ideologically, namely, which is not grounded on any closed system of beliefs, dogmas or ideas. Democracy, as Castoriadis puts it, is the project of breaking the closure at the collective level. Therefore, in a democratic society, dogmas and closed systems of ideas cannot constitute parts of the dominant social paradigm, although, of course, individuals can have whatever beliefs they wish, as long as they are committed to uphold the democratic principle, namely the principle according to which society is autonomous, institutionalised as inclusive democracy.
So, the democratic principle is not grounded on any divine, natural or social laws or tendencies, but on our own conscious and self-reflective choice between the two main historical traditions: the tradition of heteronomy which has been historically dominant, and the tradition of autonomy. The choice of autonomy implies that the institution of society is not based on any kind of irrationalism (faith in God, mystical beliefs, etc.), or on objective truths about social evolution grounded on natural, or social laws (like the ones Proudhon and Marx thought they derived). The fundamental element of autonomy is the creation of our own truth, something that social individuals can only achieve through direct democracy, that is, the process through which they continually question any institution, tradition or truth. In a democracy, there are simply no given truths. The practice of individual and collective autonomy presupposes autonomy in thought.
But, if it is neither feasible, nor desirable to ground the demand for democracy on scientific or objective laws or tendencies which direct social evolution towards the fulfilment of objective potentialities, then, this demand can only be founded on a liberatory project. Such a liberatory project today can only constitute a synthesis of the democratic, the socialist, the libertarian and radical green and feminist traditions. In other words, it can only be a project for an inclusive democracy, in the sense of political, economic, social and ecological democracy.
Still, the fact that the project for autonomy in general and for an inclusive democracy in particular i reduction of general costs; considered in its own significance and in its tendency, it is the mode by which collective activity manifests and exercises itself, the expression of social spontaneity, the emblem of democracy and equality, the most energetic instrument for the constitution of value, the support of association (...) Monopoly is the natural opposite of competition. This simple observation suffices, as we have remarked, to overthrow the utopias based upon the idea of abolishing competition, as if its contrary were association and fraternity. Competition is the vital force which animates the collective being: to destroy it, if such a supposition were possible, would be to kill society.
There are two ways in which one may interpret these Proudhonian statements on competition. One way is to see them within the institutional framework of a market economy, as Marx did and aptly criticised Proudhons views on the matter. The second way is to see them within Proudhons federalist economy. In the former case, Proudhons statements on competition betray a poor understanding of its economic significance as the mechanism providing the dynamics of the market economy system. This is evident for instance by the following statement in which Proudhon makes clear that he sees the present antagonistic society as a question of equilibrium ―which has always been the problem, (i.e. even before the creation of the market economy),― and not as the inevitable outcome of the dynamics of this system which emerged just two centuries ago, as Polanyi has shown:
Socialism (...) accuses society of antagonism, and through the same antagonism it goes in pursuit of reform. It asks capital for the poor labourers, as if the misery of labourers did not come from the competition of capitalists as well as from the factitious opposition of labour and capital; as if the question were not today precisely what it was before the creation of capital, ―that is, still and always a question of equilibrium; as if, in short, let us repeat it incessantly, let us repeat it to satiety,― the question were henceforth of something other than a synthesis of all the principles brought to light by civilization, and as if, provided this synthesis, the idea which leads the world, were known, there would be any need of the intervention of capital and the State to make them evident. 
Marx therefore had a much superior understanding of the economic significance of competition, although he himself fell victim of his scientific interpretation of history, as it is indicated by the fact that in his dialectical scheme he considered competition as engendered by feudal monopoly which represents the thesis, competition the antithesis and modern monopoly the synthesis. In other words, Marx sees the establishment of the system of the market economy as a product of evolution. But, as I tried to show elsewhere, there is no convincing evidence to support the Marxist view that some sort of evolutionary process could explain the move from pre-market economy forms of economic organisation to the present internationalised market economy. In fact, the market economy itself did not actually evolve out of a feudal era but literally exploded, particularly in England, during the eighteenth and especially nineteenth centuries. Therefore, contrary to what liberals and Marxists assert, the marketization of the economy was not just an evolutionary process that inevitably followed the expansion of mercantilist trade.
However, if we accept the hypothesis that competition is the motor of the market economy this means that the present concentration of economic power and the internationalisation of the market economy are not just the result of bad government policies, or market failures. As I tried to show elsewhere, the shift from proprietary (or entrepreneurial) capitalism to the present internationalised market economy, where a few giant corporations control the world economy, did not happen, as for instance Chomsky presents it, as the outcome of a reaction to great market failures of the late nineteenth century. It was competition, which led from simple entrepreneurial firms to the present giant corporations. The market failures are not a God-given calamity. Excepting the case of monopolies, almost all market failures in history have been directly or indirectly related to competition. It was competition, which created the need for expansion, so that the best (from the point of view of profits) technologies and methods of organising production (economies of scale etc) are used. It was the same competition, which had led to the present explosion of mergers and take-overs in the advanced capitalist countries, as well as the various strategic alliances. In this problematique, it is not possible, within the existing institutional framework of parliamentary democracy and the market economy, to check the process of increasing concentration of economic power.
Still, Proudhons celebration of competition is reproachable not only if we see it within the institutional framework of the market economy but, as I will try to show below, even if we see it within his own federalist system. But, let us see first his conception of democracy compared to that of Marx.
3. Beyond the Marxian and Proudhonian conceptions of democracy
Another area in which I think we have to transcend today both Marx and Proudhon is their views on democracy ―a topic which became crucial after the collapse of actually existing socialism. It is not accidental that for Marxists, as well as for many libertarians including Proudhon, democracy, even if it is meant as direct democracy, is considered as a kind of rule which presupposes a division between state and society. It is therefore obvious that both the Marxist conception of democracy, as well as that adopted by several libertarians including Proudhon, is incompatible with the classical conception of it.
Thus, as regards first the Marxist conception of democracy, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, it is clearly a statist conception of democracy. In this conception, democracy is not differentiated from the state for the entire historical period which separates capitalism from communism, that is, for the entire period that is called the realm of necessity, when scarcity leads to class antagonisms which make inevitable class dictatorships of one kind or another. In this view, socialism will simply replace the dictatorship of one class, the bourgeoisie, by that of another, the proletariat. Thus, for Marx
Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into another. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.
commitment to direct democracy, or anarchy in the socio-political sphere, I incompatible with political authority (...)The only authority that can exist in a direct democracy is the collective authority vested in the body politic (...) it is doubtful if authority can be created by a group of equals who reach decisions by a process of mutual persuasion.
The democratic ideal is that the masses who are governed should at the same time govern, and that society should be the same thing as the State and the people the same thing as the government (...) if the state were never larger than a city or a commune, I would allow each person to judge its form by himself and that would be the end of the matter (...) but we are dealing with vast regions in which towns, villages and hamlets run into the thousands. 
The desirability criticism refers to the fact that competition among groups of workers may easily lead to new inequalities between more and less competitive/productive groups, as it always had happened in the past whenever various forms of social or socialist market have been attempted. The market by itself cannot achieve equality since differences in productivity are bound to lead to differences in competitiveness which, in turn, would create new huge inequalities at the macro-economic level, even if exchanges are equivalent at the micro level ―as Proudhon assumed. Unless, of course, a strong degree of statism is introduced to control the market, something, however, which is supposedly ruled out in the Proudhonian system that anticipates the long term phasing out of state. And, of course, the introduction of a minimum basic income, as suggested today by, among others, orthodox Green economists is not likely to eliminate the inevitable huge inequalities. An effective scheme of minimum guaranteed income, even if it was feasible within a market economy, would, at most, secure the satisfaction of basic needs. But, in a market and money economy this cannot avoid the creation of huge inequalities in the distribution of wealth and, consequently, in the distribution of economic power. Furthermore, if the proposed exchange scheme is not linked to a system of collective ownership of the means of production then the Proudhonian federalist system is bound to end up as another version of the capitalist system.
Finally, as Murray Bookchin stresses, there is no historical evidence supporting the Proudhonian contractual ideal of association as far as the pre-hierarchical societies is concerned:
Preliterate societies never adhered to this contractual ideal of association; indeed, they resisted every attempt to impose it. To be sure, there were many treaties between tribes and alliances with strangers. But, contractual ties within tribes were essentially nonexistent. Not until hierarchy has scored its triumph in the early world and begun its journey into class society did equivalence, equity and contract begin to form the context for human social relationships. The quid pro quo of exchange and its ethical balance sheets were simply irrelevant to a community guided by the customs of usufruct, complementarity, and the irreducible minimum.
It is therefore not surprising that libertarians like Bookchin conclude that Proudhons strong emphasis on individual ownership, self-interest, contractual market relationships, and distribution based on ability rather than need ―and his implacable hostility to associationism and communism― all were surprisingly indistinguishable from the conventional bourgeois wisdom of his day.
It is for these reasons that, to my mind, the model of economic democracy proposed by the Inclusive Democracy project can, through the proposed combination of democratic planning with a system of vouchers, ensure freedom of choice and the meeting of the basic needs of all citizens within a framework of equal distribution of political and economic power.
To conclude, I think that what we need today, on the way to developing a new liberatory project, is not to go back to Marx or Proudhon but instead to assimilate the bitter experiences of the socialist (statist and libertarian) movement in the last century and a half and develop a new kind of problematique suitable for todays reality of the internationalised market economy. A problematique which will be the basis for a new project aiming to transcend both the socialist and democratic traditions, in a new synthesis which will not just be another utopia (justified by pseudo-scientific or objective laws of social evolution) but also a way out of the chronic multidimensional crisis to which the dynamic of the market economy and representative democracy has led us.
 Karl Marx, Preface to the first German edition of Das Capital (Moscow: Progress Publishers/Lawrence & Wishart, 1965), pp. 8-10.
 Vladimir Lenin, What the Friends of the People Are, in Reader in Marxist Philosophy, H. Selsam and H. Martel, eds. (NY: International Publishers, 1963), pp. 196-97.
 P.J. Proudhon, System of Economical Contradictions: or, the Philosophy of Misery, translated from the French (1846) by Benj. R. Tucker, published and sold by Benj. R. Tucker, Boston, Mass. 1888 (Cambridge: John Wilson and Son), vol. I, p. 43.
 The Philosophy of Misery, p. 44.
 The Philosophy of Misery, p. 47.
 The Philosophy of Misery, p. 56.
 The Philosophy of Misery, p. 52.
 The Philosophy of Misery, pp. 58-59 & 62
 Marx to J.B. Schweitzer (24/1/1865) in Carl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (1847) (London: Lawrence & Wishart) pp.171-72
 C. Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, pp. 95-96
 Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value (vol IV of Capital, Part II) (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1969)
 G. McLennan, Marxism and the Methodologies of History (London: Verso, 1981), p. 27.
 Takis Fotopoulos, Towards An Inclusive Democracy, The Crisis of the Growth Economy and the Need For A New Liberatory Project (London: Cassell, 1997), ch. 8.
 Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism (London: Routledge, 1958), p. 145.
 Vladimir Lenin, What Is to Be Done? (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), cf. pp. 30-32.
 H. Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, p. 147.
 Letter of Proudhon to Marx, 17/5/1846 in Selected Writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, ed by Stewart Edwards (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 151
 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Retreat from Autonomy: Postmodernism as Generalised Conformism in his World in Fragments (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp.32-46.
 Paul Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason (London: Verso, 1987), p. 306.
 Takis Fotopoulos, Towards An Inclusive Democracy, ch. 5.
 Cynthia Farrar, referring to the thought of the sophist philosopher Protagoras. See her article, Ancient Greek Political Theory as a Response to Democracy in Democracy, John Dunn, ed. (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 24.
 Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, p. 21.
 Peter Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread (NY: Penguin, 1972), Ch. 13.
 Takis Fotopoulos, Towards An Inclusive Democracy, ch. 6.
 See, Heinz Kohler, Welfare and Planning (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1966), pp. 129-36. See also Morris Bornstein, The Soviet Centrally Planned Economy in Comparative Economic Systems, Morris Bornstein (Homewood Illinois: Richard Irwin, 1985).
 Takis Fotopoulos, Towards An Inclusive Democracy, ch. 6.
 Takis Fotopoulos, Towards An Inclusive Democracy, ch. 6.
 P.J. Proudhon, The Philosophy of Misery, pp. 259-60.
 P.J. Proudhon, The Philosophy of Misery, p. 270.
 P.J. Proudhon, The Philosophy of Misery, p. 272.
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, (Boston: Beacon, 1944), chs 5-6.
 P.J. Proudhon, The Philosophy of Misery, p. 317.
 C. Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 131.
 Takis Fotopoulos, Towards An Inclusive Democracy, ch.1.
 Murray Bookchin, From Urbanization to Cities, (London: Cassell, 1995) p. 181.
 See Takis Fotopoulos Mass Media, Culture and Democracy Democracy & Nature, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 33-64.
 Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1937), p. 25.
 V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1917), pp. 31-32.
 P-J Proudhon, What is Property? ed. by Donald R. Kelley & Bonnie G. Smith, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 28.
 P-J Proudhon, The Federal Principle, (1863), pp. 272-74, in SW p. 103.
 P-J Proudhon, The Federal Principle, (1863), p. 288, in SW p. 104.
 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp.32-33.
 See e.g. Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, p. 157.
 See, for instance, Murray Bookchin, From Urbanisation to Cities , p. 43.
 April Carter, Authority and Democracy (London: Routledge, 1979).
 April Carter, Authority and Democracy, p. 69.
 April Carter, Authority and Democracy, p. 38.
 William McKercher, Liberalism as Democracy, Democracy & Nature, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 113-156.
 Political Contradictions: Theory of the Constitutional Movement in the 19th century (1863-64) pp.237-38, in Selected Writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (SW) ed. by Stewart Edwards (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 117.
 P-J Proudhon, The Federal Principle, (1863) pp. 290-91, in SW p. 105.
 P-J Proudhon, The Federal Principle, (1863) p. 317-19, in SW p. 105.
 P-J Proudhon, The Federal Principle, (1863) p. 315, in SW p. 106.
 P-J Proudhon, The Federal Principle, (1863) p. 357, in SW p. 111.
 Peter Marshall, Demanding The Impossible-A History of Anarchism, (London: Harper, 1992), pp. 252-262.
 See, e.g. James Robertson, Beyond the Dependency Culture, (Twickenham: Adamantine Press, 1998), ch. 16.
 Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, (Montreal: Black Rose, 1991) p. 320.
 Murray Bookchin, The Third Revolution, Popular Movements in the Revolutionary Era, Vol. 2 (London: Cassell, 1998), p. 41.